If both players play with skill and tenacity, the battle will result in heavy casualties, but the outcome will probably be in doubt until the last turn of the game. No conclusions about the result of most individual games can be reached, since the outcome depends on the relative skill of the players battering each other over a few precious hexagons. That is what makes Drive on Washington so fascinating and such a tense game and excellent simulation.

**Extra Scenario and Optional Rules**

While Drive on Washington represents the actual forces engaged in the Battle of Monocacy, there were other units potentially available for combat that were not committed to the battle. On the Union side, several regiments of Ricketts’ Division were expected to arrive throughout the day of the battle, and this kept Wallace wondering and worrying. On the Confederate side, General Breckinridge’s motley command of troops was held in reserve guarding the Confederate supply trains, but it could have been committed to action by Early. To represent these forces, the following Order of Battle is listed and the following special rules are suggested. It should be noted that this scenario has not been playtested and the commitment of these troops on either side could drastically alter the balance of the game.

**Union Order of Battle**

-the “missing” regiments of Ricketts:
- 6th Maryland Infantry/McClennan’s Brigade / R4-Strength/4-Morale.
- 67th Pennsylvania Infantry/McClennan’s Brigade / R4-Strength/4-Morale.
- 122nd Ohio Infantry/McClennan’s Brigade / R3-Strength/4-Morale.

**Special Rules for Union Reinforcements**

1. The 122nd Ohio Infantry Regiment has a strength of “5” only when combined with the 122nd Ohio Regiment already on the map. Otherwise, the reinforcing unit has a “3” strength counter placed under it (this represents 3 companies of the regiment that had gotten separated somewhere in the move to the Monocacy). Both units of the 122nd may operate separately on the map, but the Union player may combine them at any point in which they occupy the same hex during the Union final Command Phase. If either unit is routed, combination may not occur. If either unit has taken losses before combining, the strength of the combined regiment is correspondingly reduced. Once combined, they may not be separated.

2. If the Union reinforcements are received, the Brigade Combat Effectiveness Level of McClennan’s Brigade is changed from 9 of 15 to 16 of 26 Strength Points lost or out of ammunition.

3. The Union reinforcements are received on the next turn after Game-Turn 9 in which the Union player has successfully rolled the die for them. The Union player may roll one die in his Command Phase starting on Game-Turn 9; on a die roll of “1,” the Union reinforcements enter in the next Union Movement Phase on hex 0105 in column formation. Alternatively, the Union player may delay the entry of these reinforcements once he has received them. If he delays their entry by two turns (i.e., three turns after the successful die roll), they may enter in hex 0123, 0134, or 0138.

**Confederate Order of Battle**

(for Breckinridge’s command):

Major General J.C. Breckinridge/2-Command Points.

Brigadier General J. Echols/4-Command Radius/1-Rally Point / (4)-Promotion Rating/Echols Replacement/3-Command Radius/0-Rally Point.

22nd Virginia Infantry Regiment/Echols/R3-Strength/4-Morale.

23rd Virginia Infantry Regiment/Echols/R3-Strength/4-Morale.

26th Virginia Infantry Regiment/Echols/R2-Strength/4-Morale.

Brigadier General G.C. Wharton/5-Command Radius/1-Rally Point / (5)-Promotion Rating/Wharton’s Replacement/3-Command Radius/0-Rally Point.

45th Virginia Infantry Regiment/Wharton/R3-Strength/4-Morale.

51st Virginia Infantry Regiment/Wharton/R3-Strength/4-Morale.

30th Virginia Infantry Battalion/Wharton/R1-Strength/4-Morale.

Brigadier General J.C. Vaughn/4-Command Radius/1-Rally Point / (3)-Promotion Rating/Vaughn’s Replacement/3-Command Radius/0-Rally Point.

Dismounted Cavalry Detachment/Vaughn/R3-Strength/3-Morale.

Dismounted Cavalry Detachment/Vaughn/R2-Strength/3-Morale.

Dismounted Cavalry Detachment/Vaughn/R2-Strength/3-Morale.

(Note: The Confederate player should assign an arbitrary identification number to the three detachments of Vaughn’s Brigade in order to differentiate them.)

1. The Confederate Limited Initiative rating for Breckinridge’s command is “4.”

2. The Brigade Combat Effectiveness ratings for the Confederate reinforcements are as follows: Echols/4 of 8, Wharton/4 of 7, Vaughn/3 of 7.

3. In this scenario, Breckinridge’s units are placed on the Harper’s Ferry Road in column formation anywhere north of hex 3518 at the start of the game. These units may not be moved unless the Union player crosses the Monocacy River or the Confederate player successfully rolls a die to commit them. The Confederate player may roll a die to attempt to commit Breckinridge’s troops during any Confederate Final Command Phase after which at least one Confederate division has reached Confederate Limited Initiative. If only one Confederate division has reached CLI, a die roll of “1” or “2” successfully commits Breckinridge’s command. If two Confederate divisions have reached CLI, a die roll of “1” through “4” commits Breckinridge’s command. If three Confederate divisions have reached CLI, then Breckinridge’s command is automatically committed.

4. The die roll to commit Breckinridge’s command is optional at the discretion of the Confederate player. Once he attempts a first die roll for commitment, though, he must continue to roll the die every Confederate final command phase.

5. Breckinridge’s units may be moved in the next Confederate Movement Phase after commitment.

6. There is a penalty in victory points for attempting to commit Breckinridge’s command. This penalty is three points per turn remaining in the game after a successful die roll for commitment of these reinforcements.

7. If Breckinridge becomes a casualty, he is not replaced.

8. If Early becomes a casualty, Breckinridge is promoted and replaces Early and Breckinridge is not replaced.

9. If both Breckinridge and Early are casualties, use the standard rules for promotions.

10. Breckinridge’s command has no division commander. Breckinridge himself may be used like Early (i.e., lend command points, rally units, and negate CLI), but only for the units in his command and for Gordon’s Division. Breckinridge may not function in any way with Ramseur’s or Rodès’ Divisions.

11. The commitment of Breckinridge does not change Early’s capabilities in any way except that Breckinridge and Early may not both lend command points to the same commander in the same turn.

12. Once committed, Breckinridge’s units are counted normally for victory purposes. If they are not committed, they do not count in Confederate victory point calculations.

**Optional Rules**

Several of the sources used for Drive on Washington disagree on certain points. At least three of these sources, including the Official Records, have different Orders of Battle for the Union artillery units than are represented in Drive on Washington. Thus, if both players agree, the Order of Battle for Union troops should be modified as follows. All optional rules should be used together.

1. The 9th New York Heavy Artillery Regiment should be deleted from the game as artillery and a counter for its deployment as infantry should be made to read: 9th New York/McClennan/R3-Strength/4-Morale.

2. If the 9th New York is used as infantry as above, the BCE rating for McClennan’s Brigade becomes 11 of 18. If the Union reinforcements are later received, McClennan’s Brigade BCE rating becomes 18 of 29.

3. According to both Captain Alexander (the commander of the Baltimore Battery) and General Wallace, the Baltimore Battery had only 6 guns instead of 8 as in the game. Therefore, if both players agree, change both the Baltimore Md. Battery A and B to 3 guns each.
By mid-June of 1864, with Federals before Petersburg, Lee needed to force Grant into either letting up some pressure in that area, or to lure him into rash Cold Harbor-like assaults there. On June 28, Major General Jubal Early, with the II Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, left Staunton, in the upper Shenandoah Valley, with instructions from Lee to cause, by threatening Washington, as much consternation as possible among Federal authorities. By 2 July, Early was already at Winchester, in the lower Valley, driving in feebly opposition under Major General Franz Sigel, who retreated into Harper's Ferry.

July 3-5 was spent demonstrating against Harper's Ferry, collecting food, awaiting a shipment of shoes (!) and preparing to cross the Potomac. On 5 July, Early crossed at Shepherdstown, bypassing Harper's Ferry, which was too strong to take. From 6 to 8 July, he moved into Hagerstown, through the passes in Catoctin Mountain and on into Frederick, Maryland, only two days march from Washington.

McCausland's cavalry command levied $20,000 on Hagerstown as reparations for Federal depredations in the Valley by Major General David Hunter earlier that summer. The Confederates demanded a further $200,000 from Frederick.

By the 8th of July, Washington was in an uproar because of the raid, as it was then unclear whether Early's force was a substantial part, or only a small portion, of Lee's Army. On this day, the only thing blocking the Confederates' way on the banks of the Monocacy River was a pick-up brigade under Major General Lew Wallace, plus the timely arrival of a division from the Petersburg lines. Wallace had a difficult assignment: with a force of Maryland militia and other garrison troops from Baltimore and Washington (some outside his technical jurisdiction) plus one battery, he was expected to delay a corps of seasoned veterans. Fortuitously for him, a division from the VI Corps of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Brigadier General James Ricketts, had embarked in Baltimore on the 7th and 8th. Ricketts, not finding Wallace there, had the initiative to commandeer railroad transportation and to rush his command to the Monocacy River just in time to man the entrenchments guarding the main crossings on the evening of the 8th. Several regiments did not arrive in time to take part in the battle; this was a source of some consternation to Wallace throughout the next day — something of a repetition of the situation he had put Grant through at Shiloh two years earlier! There, Wallace made his arrangements for the next morning's assault he knew would come, as the Confederates were already driving his Maryland Brigade through Frederick toward the river.

The Maryland (First Separate) Brigade, under Brigadier General Erastus Tyler, was to guard the crossings on the north (right) end of the line. For this purpose, Wallace could spare him only half of the Baltimore (Md.) Battery, three 3-inch rifles. Tyler was told to hold the crossings to the Baltimore road at all hazards, as that was where the Federals would have to retreat. Wallace believed, quite correctly, that Early would throw his main assault at the Union left, in order to get on the main road to Washington. He knew that he could not stop Early, but wanted to delay his advance for at least half a day to keep him from getting 15 miles closer to Washington by nightfall.

Lt. Colonel D.R. Clendenin's small brigade of cavalry was given the impossible task of not only skirmishing with the Rebels fanning out from Frederick, but also watching the fords below Monocacy Junction. Ricketts, with his veterans, was to entrench himself at the Monocacy Junction crossings (the wooden bridge and the iron railroad bridge) and to contest the main assaults. He was given the other half of the Baltimore (Md.) Battery (three 3-inch rifles) for support, while there was one 24-pounder howitzer set up by a blockhouse at the eastern end of the wooden bridge to cover the approaches to the bridges. Captain F.W. Alexander, commander of the Baltimore (Md.) Battery, reported that an additional (12-pounder) "mountain howitzer" was also, dragged away in the subsequent retreat, but where it was used is unknown. This mountain howitzer was not mentioned in Wallace's report, while Ricketts's report has been lost.

Early on the 9th of July the Confederates moved out of Frederick. A portion of the Rebel command remained in the city in order to collect the $200,000 in reparations. The rest of Early's infantry fanned out beyond the city toward the crossings of the Monocacy River. On the outskirts of the city, they met Federal skirmishers supported by a section of guns, which they steadily pushed toward the river. Early had most of his command deploy in line of battle, with Rodes' division heading toward the stone bridge on the Baltimore road, Ramseur's toward the main crossings on the direct road to Washington at Monocacy Junction, and Gordon's division searching for a way to cross lower down the river to outflank the entrenchments which were found covering the Junction. Sixteen pieces of artillery supported the Confederate right, and were soon engaged by the howitzer at the main crossing, plus some smaller guns. Breckinridge's command, with the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the Junction.

Early's division commanders found themselves much delayed in finding easy crossings, due to vigorous Federal skirmishing, so Early had to make an examination in person to find a crossing from which to flank the enemy position. While he was engaged in this reconnaissance, he discovered McCausland (whose cavalry had just arrived from the Hagerstown and Catoctin Mountain area) in the act of crossing the river with his brigade about 9:30 at a ford below Monocacy Junction. As soon as he crossed, he dismounted his men and advanced rapidly against the Union left held by part of Clendenin's cavalry, which was soon reinforced by part of Rickett's division (McClellan's brigade). Orders were immediately sent to Major General John C. Breckinridge to move up rapidly with Gordon's division to McCausland's assistance. Major General John B. Gordon crossed about 10:30, overrunning the forces which were manning Wallace's first line of defense at the advance fence.

The Confederates had a great deal of trouble keeping their brigades in formation due to bales piled around in the fields they had to cross. In addition, the fences crossing the fields were difficult to traverse. When units tried to climb the fences, they sustained heavy casualties. Gordon was temporarily stalled. He succeeded in reforming his division in a patch of heavy woodland in the middle of the fields after driving the defenders from the first fence. He then carried out a series of assaults on the second fence line, but this time most of Ricketts' division had been diverted to the Union left, stiffening resistance.

The second fence was fiercely contested, along with the little stream behind it, to the point that Early wrote, "So profuse was the flow of blood from the killed and wounded....that it reddened the stream for more than one hundred yards below." The pressure on the Union position on the left was too much, for in addition to Gordon's attack, Confederate artillery posted near the Junction, west of the river, had devastating enfilade fire on the Federals at the fences.echolls' division, the other half of Breckinridge's command which had been left to guard the trains, was ordered up during the engagement but was not needed.
Ricketts had to order most of his other brigade (Truex's) out of the entrenchments in order to stem Early's assaults, forcing Ricketts to order the burning of the wooden bridge across the river around 1:30 (stranding some of his own skirmishers on the west bank), but it was too late, and the pressure too great. Wallace, around 4:00, ordered Ricketts to withdraw his division northward to the Baltimore road for a general retreat to that city. This uncovered the railroad bridge, allowing Ramsour's division to cross. The Federals lost a substantial number of prisoners in this withdrawal, but no guns were lost. Their casualties were reported as 96 killed, 594 wounded and 1188 missing out of a total strength of 8750 on the field. They had delayed the Rebels for eight hours.

Early reported his losses between 600 and 700, out of about 8,000 engaged, but this is subject to serious dispute, as Gordon had reported at least that many casualties in his division alone, in the furious assaults across the fields and fences on the Federal left.

Tyler's First Separate Brigade, having kept Major General Robert Rodes from forcing a crossing at the stone bridge, acted as the rear-guard during the retreat to Baltimore.

Rodes finally crossed, snaring some of the rear-guard. Early did not pursue, but spent the rest of the evening caring for wounded, burying the dead, bringing his trains over the river and preparing for the forced march towards Washington the next morning. The Rebels never got their reparations from Frederick, but did find an ample supply of a great delicacy — ice cream — upon which they proceeded to gorge themselves.

Early was in front of Ft. Stevens, a few miles north of the Capital, two days after the battle, on the 11th. Reconnaissance soon told him that the rest of the Federal VI Corps had arrived in the Washington lines, as well as the XIX Corps, also just arrived from New Orleans after being diverted from the Virginia Peninsula.

Early decided to withdraw to Virginia, his mission partially accomplished: he had diverted Union forces from the vicinity of Richmond-Petersburg, thus relieving some pressure there. However, the Federals were now dead serious about eliminating the possibility of this type of raid in the future. Wright's VI Corps, Emory's XIX Corps, and Hunter's former command (the future VIII Corps) now arriving in the Harper's Ferry region, under George Crook, were soon to become the Army of the Shenandoah under General Phil Sheridan.

4. Also according to both Alexander and Wallace, the Union had a 24-pounder howitzer located in the trenches at the end of the Wooden Bridge. If agreed upon by both players, make a counter for one 24-pounder and place it in hex 2214 with crew at the start of the game. However, this howitzer has no limber and cannot be moved unless a limber is sent from either the Baltimore Md. A or B. The limber must move from the Baltimore Md. unit, sending it to hex 2214 before the 24-pounder can be limbered and moved. A counter must be made for this limber. Sending such a limber does not affect in any way the movement of the Baltimore Md. A or B.

5. The counter for the 24-pounder is an HB 1. The chart for its attack strength and range can be taken from Bloody April or the chart for the Mountain Howitzers in Drive on Washington can be used as they are essentially the same.

Erratum
The 81st Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment should be labeled the 87th.

Notes on Research
Since the Battle of the Monocacy was a relatively minor episode in the Civil War, there is comparatively little primary and secondary material available about the battle. What is available is fraught with the usual contradictions, omissions, and inaccuracies that are typical of the period. Thus, it is impossible to state with absolute accuracy the composition of certain units on the battlefield.

An excellent case in point is the question of the Union artillery. At least three normally reliable sources state or clearly imply that the 9th New York Heavy Artillery Regiment was deployed without guns and used as infantry in this battle, as it was in several other battles. (However, another part of the 9th New York was used as artillery but it was not present at Monocacy.) Wallace himself in his official report of the battle mentions that he had 7 guns, 6 with the Baltimore Md. Battery and the lone 24-pounder in the trenches. This is confirmed by Captain Alexander's official report. Yet Alexander also mentions dragging from the battlefield one mountain howitzer that is mentioned nowhere in the other sources. Where was it? What did it do? Whose command did it belong to? These questions are impossible to answer from the source material used for this article.

Likewise, the question of Breckinridge's "command" as given in the extra scenario was quite difficult to track down. Breckinridge had been the Shenandoah Valley command since March of 1864. When Early arrived in the Valley with II Corps, he attached Breckinridge's "command" for the raid on Washington. Because of Breckinridge's rank and prestige, he had to be given a larger command within Early's organization, so he was assigned control over Gordon's Division as well as his own command, which (as far as it is possible to tell) was assigned to Echols. Breckinridge's "command" at the Monocacy thus consisted of Gordon's Division plus the brigades of Echols, Wharton, and Vaughn, the last being dismounted cavalry.

It is impossible to determine from these sources whether Vaughn himself was present on the battlefield. At least one source shows Vaughn's brigade commanded by an officer named Patton. (Perhaps this was an earlier incarnation of General George Patton.) Breckinridge's "command" — other than Gordon's Division — had a strength of approximately 2200 men. All of this serves only as a warning to those who would accept the optional rules and the extra scenario as gospel. These are based on the best sources and the best guesses that the authors could agree upon, and are certainly not definitive.

Sources
The following material was used as sources for this article.

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