


Foxbat & Phantom

A solo scenario devised by A J Gilham for SPI's game of tactical aerial combat in the 1970's

This scenario, taken from an idea by Jim Dunnigan (Footnotes, S&T 45), represents a highly experienced pilot opposing very inexperienced pilots. The player controls one aircraft, whilst the 'Enemy' has three or four. Play this as a Radar Interception Mission Scenario with either side as intruder — use the spotting rules. The 'Enemy' airplanes' moves are determined by the Instructions Chance Table. Two dice are rolled for each 'Enemy' aircraft — their sum is cross-indexed on the table to find that aircraft's move.



A few explanations might be useful:
2,5,6,8,9,12: if standard move from table is not possible, substitute 'level flight, no speed change'.

3: the aircraft in question should move as far away from the Player's aircraft as possible. This may mean that it leaves the map. If it does, it may not return.

5: 'dive according to die roll' means roll one die: 1,2,3,4,5 means 'horizontal dive that number of levels'; 6 means 'vertical dive'. If a move is not possible, substitute 'level flight no speed change'.

11: make the best possible move under the circumstances.

In all cases you should try to optimize the 'Enemy's' play; 'Enemy' aircraft fire whenever possible — if more than one can fire, the one with the best chance of hitting fires.

Victory conditions: either standard RIM, or (better), the Player must shoot down every 'Enemy' plane by turn 25.

Fighting Instructions Chance Table

- | | |
|----|---|
| 2 | Vertical Dive |
| 3 | Level flight away from Player's aircraft; accelerate |
| 4 | Level flight; accelerate |
| 5 | Dive according to die roll if speed greater than level max., otherwise level flight; maximum acceleration |
| 6 | Dive one level; accelerate one step |
| 7 | Level flight, no speed change |
| 8 | Climb if possible |
| 9 | Climb if possible |
| 10 | Level flight; accelerate |
| 11 | Improvise |
| 12 | Vertical Dive |

Profile: Soviet Airborne

The Strategic Guerillas

This is the first of an occasional series by Sam Marks which will briefly look at a wide variety of subjects ranging from weapon systems to tactical doctrine.

The airborne forces of the USSR are an elite formation, like most other similar formations elsewhere in the world, and they are made up of hand-picked conscripts and regulars drawn from all branches of the Soviet Army. Many will have had previous parachute experience from sporting and club activities. Their training programme is exceptionally tough and explicit.

It is important to note that in terms of the tactical doctrine behind their training the Soviet High Command does not distinguish between its airborne forces and its similar naval "assault" forces. The basic concept of the various air/sea assault operations is not in anyway determined by the means of transport involved. Indeed, the concept dates back far into Soviet military history and initially could only be carried out by sea. By 1920 however, aircraft became available that made it possible to land or paratroop considerable numbers of troops and equipment.

The USSR was one of the first nations to recognise the potential of air-transported troops and held the first large scale exercise as far back as the early 1930's. Their first large scale heli-borne landings were demonstrated, using upwards of one hundred helicopters, in exercises in 1956. Strangely though, the Soviets seemed less ready to adopt the use of helicopters in the way that the Americans did with their Airmobile Units. This is probably due to the cost of the machines and their relative vulnerability, in the European theatre, to a possible tactical nuclear counter-strike against any such concentration of helicopters.

During WWII a number of tactical assaults were carried out, those made by naval forces being, in the main, the more successful. This may have been a result of a general lack of specialised equipment for airborne operations and the very high standard and length of training required. The Eastern front wasn't too fussy about what sort of troops it chewed up just so long as there were plenty of them.

In recent years, however, the USSR has been to enormous lengths to train, develop and equip its airborne units. Modern technology has not appreciably altered the concept of their use but has simply provided newer alternatives to its means of implementation.

There are reckoned to be 7/8 Airborne Divisions available now, all based deep inside the Soviet Union rather than deployed with their Warsaw Pact Allies in and around Germany. All these units are trained and combat-ready to carry out a number of roles and play an important part in modern Soviet military theory. The task that they are primarily trained to carry out involves a concept that does not appear to have a direct equivalent in western theory.

Not only are they for use as adjuncts to a large-scale operation but they are also trained for use in strategic defense, when no other means are available. They deploy with considerable speed and complete secrecy to obtain the all-important element of surprise. They represent the most effective use of resources available and require an enemy to deploy far greater forces, out of all proportion, to counter the possible attack in the rear or flank. They could almost be described as strategic guerillas! The Russians place great strength in

Cont. on page 19